Posté le 06.04.2007 par romainb
Brase, G.L. (2004). What we reason about and why: How evolution explains reasoning. In: K. Manktelow & M.C. Chung (Eds.) Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives. (pp. 309-331 ) Hove: Psychology Press.
http://web.missouri.edu/~braseg/publications/2004ReasoningEvolution.pdf
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Posté le 04.04.2007 par romainb
Barrouillet, P., & Lecas, J.F. (1999). Mental models in conditional reasoning and working memory. Thinking & Reasoning, 5(4), 289-302.
Blaye, A., Ackerman, E., & Light, P. (1999). The relevance of relevance in children's cognition. In J. Bliss, P. Light, & R. Saljo (Eds), Learning sites : social and technological contexts for learning, (pp.120-131). Amsterdam : Pergamon.
Bringsjord, S. (1998). In Defense of Logical Minds. Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), pp. 173-178.
Doise, W., & Mugny G. (1997). Le raisonnement formel : nouvelles perspectives. In W. Doise, G. Mugny (Eds.), Psychologie sociale et développement cognitif, (pp.191-206). Paris : Armand Colin.
Fong, G.T., & Nisbett, R.E. (1991). Immediate and delayed transfer of training effects in statistical reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 120, 34-45.
Grosset, N., Barrouillet, P., & Misuraca, R. (2004). Développement du raisonnement conditionnel et tâche de sélection de Wason. L’Année Psychologique, 104, 51-81.
Hiraishi, K., & Hasegawa, T. (2001). Sharing-rule and detection of free-riders in cooperative groups : Evolutionarily important deontic reasoning in the Wason Selection task. Thinking and Reasoning, 7 (3), 255-294.
Janveau-Brennan, G., & Markovits, H. (1999). Reasoning with causal conditionals: Developmental and individual differences. Developmental Psychology, 35(4), 904-911.
Klaczynski, P. A., Schuneman, M. J., & Daniel, D. B. (2004). Theories of conditional reasoning: A developmental Examination of Competing Hypotheses. Developmental Psychology, 40, 559-571.
Klaczynski, P.A. (2000) Motivated scientific reasoning biases, epistemological beliefs, and the theory polarization: a two process approach to adolescent cognition. Child Dev. 71, 1347–1366
Klaczynski, P.A. (2001) Analytic and heuristic processing influences on
adolescent reasoning and decision-making. Child Dev. 72, 844–861
Noveck, I. A. (2001).When children are more logical than adults: Investigations of scalar implicature.Cognition, 78, 165-188.
Noveck, I.A., Ho, S., & Sera, M. (1996). Children's understanding of epistemic modals. Journal of Child Language, 23, 621-643.
Noveck, I. A. & Chevaux, F. (2002). The Pragmatic Development of and. Twenty-sixth annual Boston University Conference on Language Development.Sommerville, MA: CascadillaPress.
Overton, W. F., Ward, S. L., Noveck, I. A., Black, J., & O'Brien, D. P. (1987). Form and content in the development of deductive reasoning. Developmental Psychology, 23, 22-30.
Pouscoulous, N., Noveck, I. A., Politzer, G., & Bastide, A. (in press). Evidence for the production of scalar implicature in young children. Language Acquisition.
Verzoni, K., & Swan, K. (1995). On the Nature and Development of Conditional Reasoning in Early Adolescnece. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9, 213-234.
Ward, S. L., Byrnes, J. P., & Overton, W. F. (1990). Organization of knowledge and conditional reasoning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 832-837.
Morris, B. J., & Sloutsky, V. M. (2002) Children’s solutions of logical versus emperical problems: Whats missing and what develops? Cognitive Development 16 (4), 2002, 907-928.
http://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu/html/publications.html
http://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu/2-6.pdf
Posté le 01.04.2007 par romainb
Posté le 30.03.2007 par romainb
Posté le 30.03.2007 par romainb
Posté le 30.03.2007 par romainb
http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/LMINDS/lminds.cogsci.pdf
http://astro.temple.edu/~overton/overton_byrnes_obrien_1985.pdf
http://www.hcrc.ed.ac.uk/~keith/WasonSelectionTask/
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-12456939_ITM
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/content/avky9mr391ll6k2h/
http://www.google.fr/search?client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Afr%3Aofficial&channel=s&hl=fr&q=%22training%22%2B%22wason+selection+task%22&meta=&btnG=Recherche+Google
Markman, A. B. & Gentner, D. (2001). Thinking. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 223-247.
http://www.psych.northwestern.edu/psych/people/faculty/gentner/newpdfpapers/MarkmanGentner01.pdf
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Sur la compétence des mathématiciens face à la WST, les travaux de Matthew Inglis (http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/lsri/mji/) :
Relevance Theory explains the Maze Task
http://userweb.pedf.cuni.cz/kmdm/yerme/clanky_ucast/INGLIS.pdf
Inglis, M. & Simpson, A. (2005). Heuristic biases in mathematical reasoning. In H.L. Chick & J.L. Vincent (Eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol. 3, pp. 177-184). Melbourne, Australia.h
ttp://www.nottingham.ac.uk/lsri/mji/files/pme2005.pdf
Inglis, M. & Simpson, A. (2004). Mathematicians and the Selection Task. In M. Johnsen Hoines & A.B. Fuglestad (Eds.), Proceedings of the 28th Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol. 3, pp. 89-96). Bergen, Norway.
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/lsri/mji/files/pme2004.pdf
Posté le 29.03.2007 par romainb
Posté le 28.03.2007 par romainb
Quelques lectuers du jour :
Boroditsky, L. (2007). Comparison and the development of knowledge. Cognition, 102(1), 118-128.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T24-4M81C78-2&_user=1232647&_coverDate=01%2F31%2F2007&_rdoc=8&_fmt=summary&_orig=browse&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%234908%232007%23998979998%23639038%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=4908&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=10&_acct=C000052072&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1232647&md5=583efaa5f2e630a248ae1b409c7bf9a8
La comparison d'objet s'avère êter un processus qui déforme les représenations. Ainsi comparer des objets similaire renforce une représentation similaire tandis que comparer des objets différents renforce uen vision contrastée... (les résultats rappellent un peu ceux obtenus en psychologie sociale sur l'effet des stéréotypes par exemple...)
McKinnon, M.C., & Moscovitch, M. (2007) Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: Theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored. Cognition, 102, 2, 179-218.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T24-4J8D95S-1&_user=1232647&_coverDate=02%2F28%2F2007&_rdoc=3&_fmt=summary&_orig=browse&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%234908%232007%23998979997%23639729%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=4908&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=8&_acct=C000052072&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1232647&md5=d512fd05a3a4c9cdf1627fd537709743
Concernant le raisonnement social ("social reasoning") appliqué à la Théorie de l'Esprit et à la tâche déontique de sélection, il apparait que des coapacité cognitive générales (domain-general), telles que l'atetntion, la mémoire de travail ou l'inhibition expliquent bien les performances individuelles de jeunes adultes comme d'altes plus âgés. Il apparait en outer que la performance varie en fonction de l'effort cognitif que demande la tâche (ce que prouvent les situations où les individus doivent diviser leur attention sur plusieurs tâches.
Il apparait aussi des différences entre jeune adulte et adulte âgé :
Tunteler, E., & Resing, W. C. M. (2007). Effects of prior assistance in using analogies on young children's unprompted analogical problem solving over time: A microgenetic study. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, 1, 43-68
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpsoc/bjep/2007/00000077/00000001/art00003
(Notamment une large revue de question sur l'analogie...)
Takahashi, M. (2007). Does collaborative remembering reduce false memories. British Journal of Psychology, 98 (1), 1-13
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpsoc/bjp/2007/00000098/00000001/art00001
Le remémoration collaborative ne semble pas produire plus de remémoration juste et de remémoration fausse que la remémoration individuelle. et selon l'auteur, cela prouve que la collaboration n'est pas une simple juxtaposition de capacités cognitives individuelles mais implique une "retrieval-strategy disruption"
cf. Publications de Keith Holyoak !
http://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/KeithPublications.htm
Posté le 27.03.2007 par romainb
Sutton, j. (2004). Representation, Levels, and Context in Integrational Linguistics and Distributed Cognition. Language Sciences 26 (6), 503-524.
"Distributed Cognition and Integrational Linguistics have much in common. Both approaches see communicative activity and intelligent behaviour in general as strongly context-dependent and action-oriented, and brains as permeated by history."
Distributed cognition :
- "On Clark's view, we are intricately psychologically tangled with, and our minds projected out into, a range of cognitive objects such as instruments, media, and other people".
- "To stress the 'leakiness' of the human mind is to focus on its tendencies both to co-opt and to incorporate external resources. Cognitive processes sometimes constitutively involve multiple loops between brain, body, and world, where 'world' includes
both the physical and the social environments with which embodied brains couple, the 'scaffolding' on which they lean. Cognitive states, like the processes in which they participate, are thus sometimes hybrid biological and non-biological states. So, in certain circumstances, things have a cognitive life (Sutton, 2002b). Claims like this can be put more or less strongly, and have methodological as well as metaphysical readings. And of course there is much more to say about the relevant circumstances and conditions: what's critical is the context in
which external resources are assimilated, parasitised, or internalised in some contingent 'dynamical singularity' spanning brain, body and world (Hurley, 1998a)".
Integrational linguistics :
- "To make sense of any episode of human communication we have to recognize an integration of activities being carried out by particular individuals in a particular set of circumstances. Signs are created in the course of this integrational process".
- "In Integrational Linguistics, then, analysis must focus on the context in which action-oriented symbolic activity arises. The integrationist urges us to focus on ordinary embodied skills and habits, on practical strategies of communication rather than on any set of context-free inner models of reality. [...] There is no abstract, permanent set of meanings and messages in either language or thought, prior to episodes of thinking and communicating".
- "Brains, for Cowley, are 'biosocial organs permeated by history' (Cowley, 2002, pp. 73, 75). Symbol-manipulation is unlikely to be either internal or innate in any interesting sense, but is rather an external or relational capacity learned in developing the capacities to do what feels right. What we call 'language' is then 'insinuated into developing neural organization as an individual exploits symbol-mediated activity to develop social skills and capacities"(Cowley, 2002, 85)."
- "we should not seek to categorize an abstract and general 'language system' but instead investigate the complex and diverse practices that drive changes in 'contextualizing'. Contextualizing is the use of previous experience 'to integrate activities so that, in future, their effects are likely to benefit' the agent (Cowley, 2004, especially Section 2.3). Cowley puts this perspective into practice himself in strong empirical studies of (for example) conversational turn-taking and embodied interactivity in dialogue (see Cowley, 2002, p. 87–89) and by bringing an integrationist perspective to bear on developmental linguistics and psychology (Cowley, 2004). Microstudies of the properties of talk and silence in prosody, gesture, and facial expression can combine, from an integrational point of view, into a rich picture of the development of utterance activity, the contextual exercise of utterance capacity, and the propensity to exploit external symbols."
"we should accept the inevitability of multiple contextualization and still get on with the work of seeing which contexts matter, and why, rather than remaining squeamish about the whole project of generalizing across contexts."
Posté le 27.03.2007 par romainb
Girotto ,V. Kemmelmeier, M.Sperber, D. van der Henst, J-B. 2001). Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task. Cognition, 81 (2), B69-B76.
Selon ces auteurs :
"Indirect evidence for these two claims is provided by the fact that people asked to solve a series of selection tasks, some deontic, some descriptive, show no transfer from one task to the next (e.g. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972)."
"Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) argued that participants' poor performance on the selection task is best explained by considering that (1) the very process of linguistic comprehension provides participants with intuitions of relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 1995), (2) these intuitions, just as comprehension generally, are highly content- and context-dependent, and (3) participants trust their intuitions of relevance and select cards accordingly."
"If, in the selection task, pragmatic comprehension mechanisms indeed pre-empt the use of whatever domain-general or domain-specic reasoning mechanisms people are endowed with, the task cannot be a good tool for the study of these reasoning mechanisms".
Résultat :
"The present results corroborate our predictions and confirm the analysis of Sperber et al. (1995). We showed that the same rule, whether it is tested descriptively or deontically, can be made to yield more P and Q selections or more P and not-Q selections by acting on intuitions of relevance."
Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst (2002). La perspective pragmatique dans l’étude du raisonnement et de la rationalité. L’Année Psychologique, 102, 65-108
http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/view_by_stamp.php?label=ISC&langue=fr&action_todo=view&id=ccsd-00000172&version=1